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ABSTRACT
Automated fraud behaviors detection on electronic payment
platforms is a tough problem. Fraud users often exploit the
vulnerability of payment platforms and the carelessness of
users to defraud money, steal passwords, do money launder-
ing, etc, which causes enormous losses to digital payment
platforms and users. There are many challenges for fraud
detection in practice. Traditional fraud detection methods
require a large-scale manually labeled dataset, which is hard
to obtain in reality. Manually labeled data cost tremendous
human efforts. Besides, the continuous and rapid evolution
of fraud users makes it hard to find new fraud patterns based
on existing detection rules. In our work, we propose a real-
world data oriented detection paradigm which can detect
fraud users and upgrade its detection ability automatically.
Based on the new paradigm, we design a novel fraud de-
tection model, FraudJudger, to analyze users behaviors on
digital payment platforms and detect fraud users with fewer
labeled data in training. FraudJudger can learn the latent
representations of users from unlabeled data with the help of
Adversarial Autoencoder (AAE). Furthermore, FraudJudger
can find new fraud patterns from unknown users by cluster
analysis. Our experiment is based on a real-world electronic
payment dataset. Comparing with other well-known fraud
detection methods, FraudJudger can achieve better detection
performance with only 10% labeled data.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Economics of security and
privacy.
KEYWORDS
real-world electronic payment data, fraud detection, adver-
sarial autoencoder, cluster analysis
1 INTRODUCTION
Digital payment refers to transactions that consumers pay
for products or services on the Internet. With the explo-
sive growth of electronic commerce, more and more people
choose to purchase on the Internet. Different from traditional
face-to-face payments, digital transactions are ensured by
a third-party digital payment platform. The security of the
third-party platform is the primary concern. The digital pay-
ment brings huge convenience to people’s daily life, but
it is vulnerable to cybercrime attacks [25] [28]. There are
many kinds of fraud behaviors. For example, fraudsters may
pretend to be a staff in a digital payment platform and com-
municate with normal users to steal valuable information.
Some fraudsters will use fake identities to transact in these
platforms. An estimated 73% of enterprises report some form
of suspicious activity that puts around $7.6 of every $100
transacted at risk [1]. Those frauds cause tremendous dam-
age to companies and consumers.
Challenges. Automatic detection for fraud payments is a
hot topic in companies and researchers. Many researchers
focus on understanding fraud users’ behavior patterns. It is
believed that fraud users have different habits comparing
with benign users. The first challenge is how to find useful
features to distinguish fraud users with benign users. Sun
et al. [19] use the clickstream to understand user’s behavior
and intentions. Some other features like transaction records
[33], time patterns [11] and illicit address information [13],
etc, are also proved useful in fraud detection. Fraud users
always have social connections. Some researchers focus on
analyzing user’s social networks to find suspicious behaviors
[4] [21] by graphmodels. They believe fraud users have some
common group behaviors.
The limitation of the above methods is that it is hard
to manually find appropriate features to detect frauds. In
traditional fraud detection methods, researchers should try
many features until the powerful features are found, and
these features may be partial in practice. With the help of
deep learning, we can automatically learn the best "feature".
Autoencoder [15] is an unsupervised model to learn effi-
cient data codings. It can get rid of "noise" features and only
leave essential features. Origin features are encoded to latent
representations by autoencoder. Makhzani et al. [17] com-
bine autoencoder and generative adversarial network (GAN)
[9], and propose a novel model called "adversarial autoen-
coder (AAE)". AAE can generate data’s latent representations
matching the aggregated posterior in an adversarial way.
Another challenge is lacking sufficient and convincing
manually labeled data in the real world. Manually labeled
data are always hard to obtain in reality. It costs a vast human
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resource to identify fraud users manually [24]. Besides, the
human’s judgment is sometimes subjective, and it is difficult
to detect cunning cheaters. Some researchers use unsuper-
vised learning or semi-supervised learning models to detect
frauds [7]. However, for unsupervised learning, it is hard to
set targets and evaluate the performance in training models.
New deceptive patterns of fraud users appear everyday.
With the development of detection methods, fraud users also
evolve quickly to anti-detection. It is impossible to find all
detection rules manually. Labeled data are based on historical
experience, and it is hard to find unseen fraud patterns by
using labeled data. Since unsupervised learning has no past
knowledge [5], we can use unsupervised learning methods
to find new fraud patterns.
In our work, we aim at overcoming these real-world chal-
lenges in fraud detection. We aim at analyzing users’ behav-
iors and detecting fraud users with a small ratio of labeled
data. Furthermore, we want to play an active role in the com-
petition between fraud detection and anti-detection. We aim
at detecting potential fraud users who cannot be detected by
existing detection knowledge.
FraudJudger.We propose a fraud detection model named
FraudJudger to detect digital payment frauds automatically.
Our detection model contains three steps. First, we merge
users’ operation and transaction data. Then merged features
are converted to latent representations by adversarial au-
toencoder. We can use these latent representations to classify
users. It is a semi-supervised learning process, which means
we only need a few labeled data to train the classification
model. Finally, new fraud patterns can be detected by cluster
analysis.
Contributions. In summary, our work makes the follow-
ing main contributions:
(1) We design a novel automated fraud detection para-
digm for real-world application. Based on the para-
digm, we propose a digital payment fraud detection
model FraudJudger to overcome the shortcomings of
real-world data. Our model requires fewer labeled data
and can learn efficient latent features of users.
(2) Our experiment is based on real-world data. The exper-
iment result shows that our detection model achieves
better detection performance with only 10% labeled
data comparedwith otherwell-known supervisedmeth-
ods. We propose a new measurement Cluster Recall to
evaluate cluster results, and our model outperforms
others.
(3) Our model can discover potential fraud users who
can not be detected by existing detection rules, and
analyzing behaviors of these potential fraud users can
help companies build a safer payment environment.
Roadmaps. The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. In Section 2, we present related work. Our improved
detection paradigm is provided in Section 3. Section 4 presents
the details of our detection model FraudJudger. Our experi-
ment is shown in Section 5. Finally, we conclude our research
in Section 6.
2 PRELIMINARIES
Digital Payment Fraud Detection
Recently, fraud detection on digital payment platforms be-
comes a hot issue in the finance industry, government, and
researchers. There is currently no sophisticated monitoring
system to solve such problems since the digital payment plat-
forms have suddenly emerged in recent years. Researchers
often use financial fraud detection methods to deal with
this problem. The types of financial fraud including credit
card fraud [8], telecommunications fraud [10], insurance
fraud [27] and many researchers regard these detection prob-
lems as a binary classification problem. Traditional detection
method uses rule-based systems [3] to detect the abnormal
behavior, which is eliminated by the industry environment
where financial fraud is becoming more diverse and updated
quickly. With the gradual maturity of machine learning and
data mining technologies, some artificial intelligence models
have gradually been applied to the field of fraud detection.
The models most favored by researchers are Naive Bayes
(NB), Support Vector Machines (SVM), Decision Tree, etc.
However, these models have a common disadvantage that it
is easy to overfit the training data for them. In order to over-
come this problem, some models based on bagging ensemble
classifier [30] and anomaly detection [2] are used in fraud
detection. Besides, there are also researchers who use an
entity relationship network [20] to infer possible fraudulent
activity. In recent years, more and more deep learning mod-
els are proposed. Generate adversarial network (GAN) [9] is
proposed to generate adversarial samples and simulate the
data distribution to improve the classification accuracy, and
new deep learning methods are applied in this field. Zheng
et al. [33] use a GAN based on a deep denoising autoencoder
architecture to detect telecom fraud.
Many researchers focus on the imbalanced data problem.
In the real world, fraud users account for only a small por-
tion, which will lower the model’s performance. Traditional
solutions are oversampling minority class [6]. It does not fun-
damentally solve this problem. Zhang et al. [32] construct a
clustering tree to consider imbalanced data distribution. Li et
al. [14] propose a Positive Unlabeled Learning (PU-Learning)
model that can improve the performance by utilizing posi-
tive labeled data and unlabeled data in detecting deceptive
opinions.
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Some researchers choose unsupervised learning and semi-
super-
vised learning due to lack of enough labeled data in the real-
world application. Unsupervised learning methods require
no prior knowledge of users’ labels. It can learn data dis-
tributions and have potential in finding new fraud users.
Zaslavsky et al. [31] use Self-Organizing Maps (SOM) to ana-
lyze transactions in payment platforms to detect credit card
frauds. Roux et al. [22] proposed a cluster detection based
method to detect tax fraud without requiring historic labeled
data.
In our work, we use semi-supervised learning to detect
fraud users, and an unsupervised method is applied in ana-
lyzing fraud users patterns and finding potential fraud users.
Adversarial Autoencoder
Adversarial Autoencoder (AAE) is proposed by Makhzani
et al [17]. AAE is a combination of autoencoder (AE) and
generative adversarial network (GAN). Like GAN, AAE has
a discriminator part and a generative part. The encoder part
of an autoencoder can be regarded as the generative part of
GAN. The encoder can encode inputs to latent vectors. The
mission of AAE’s discriminator is discriminating whether
an input latent vector is fake or real. The discriminator and
generator are trained in an adversarial way. AAE is trained in
an unsupervised way, and it can be used in semi-supervised
classification.
Autoencoder. AE is a feedforward neural network. The infor-
mation in its hidden layer is called latent variable z, which
learns latent representations or latent vector of inputs. Re-
cently, AE and its variants like sparse autoencoder (SAE)
[18], stacked autoencoder [26] have been widely used in
deep learning. Basic autoencoder consists of two parts: the
encoder part and the decoder part. Encoders and decoders
consist of two or more layers of fully connected layers. The
encoding process is mapping the original data feature x to
the low-dimensional hidden layer z.
z = p(x) (1)
The decoding process is reconstructing the latent variable
z to the output layer x ′ whose dimension is the same as x .
x ′ = q(z) (2)
Finally, it optimizes its own parameters according to the
Mean Square Error loss (MSE-loss) of x and x ′.
AEloss =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(x − x ′)2 (3)
Generative adversarial autoencoder. GAN is first proposed by
Ian Goodfellow et al. [9] as a new generation model. Once
proposed, it becomes one of the most popular models in the
deep learning field. The model mainly consists of two parts,
generatorG and discriminator D. The model can learn the
prior distribution p(x) of training data and then generate
data similar to this distribution. The discriminator model is
a binary-classifier that is used to distinguish whether the
sample is a newly generated sample or the real sample. GAN
is proposed based on game theory, and its training process
is a process of the mutual game. In the beginning, the gener-
ator generates some bad samples from random noise, which
is easily recognized by the discriminator, and then the gen-
erator can learn how to generate some samples that make
the discriminator difficult to discriminate or even misjudge.
In each training round, GAN will update itself through the
process of loss back-propagation. After multiple rounds of
the game, the fitting state is finally reached, that is, the gen-
erator can generate samples that hard to be distinguished by
the discriminator. Here is the loss function of GAN:
min
G
max
D
Ex∼pdata [logD(x)]+Ez∼p(z) log (1 − D(G(z))) (4)
where G represents the generator, D represents the dis-
criminator, and D(x) represents a neural network that com-
putes the probabilities that x is real-world samples rather
than the generator. p(z) represents the distribution of the
noise samples z, and D(G(z)) represents a neural network
that computes the probabilities that a sample is generated
by the generator.
Comparing AAE to GAN. Adversarial autoencoder and gen-
erative adversarial network have many similarities in unsu-
pervised learning. Both of them can learn data distributions.
However, when dealing with discrete data, it will be hard to
backpropagate gradient by GAN [29]. Many discrete features
are encoded by one-hot encoding methods. The discrimina-
tor of GAN may play tricks that it only needs to discriminate
whether the inputs are encoding in the one-hot format. AAE
learns latent representations of input features and encodes
them as continuous data. The discriminator part of AAE fo-
cuses on discriminating latent representations rather than
initial inputs so that the original data type of input features
does not matter. So AAE has advantages in dealing with
discrete features comparing with GANs. In digital payment
platforms, many features are discrete, which need to be en-
coded in one-hot format. It is more reasonable to choose
AAE.
3 FRAUD DETECTION PARADIGM
In this section, we present the traditional fraud detection
paradigm on the electronic payment platform first, and then
we show our improved paradigm.
, , Ruoyu Deng and Na Ruan
Traditional Fraud Detection Paradigm
Many digital payment platforms have been devoted to fraud
detection for many years. These platforms have their own
fraud users blacklists, and they track and analyze fraud users
on the blacklists continuously. They have concluded many
detection rules based on years of experience. As shown in
Fig 1(a), platforms can use these detection rules to detect
new fraud users and build a larger fraud user blacklist. It is
impossible to gather all kinds of fraud users in this blacklist.
There always exists unknown fraud users. These unknown
fraud users cannot be detected based on existing detection
rules. Moreover, if fraud users change their behavior patterns,
they can escape from being detected by the platforms easily.
In the traditional fraud detection paradigm, platforms cannot
find new fraud patterns until new patterns of fraud users
appear after they cause visible accidents on platforms.
The limitations of traditional fraud detection paradigm are
obvious. Platforms can only detect fraud users by existing
knowledge. It is a passive defending paradigm. Platforms
cannot update their detection rules to defense unknown
fraud users automatically, which makes themselves vulnera-
ble when new patterns of fraudsters appear.
(a) Traditional fraud detection paradigm
(b) Improved fraud detection paradigm
Figure 1: Fraud detection paradigms
Improved Fraud Detection Paradigm
Traditional fraud detection paradigm cannot update detec-
tion rules until visible accidents happen, which will cause
huge losses to platforms and other users. It is better to have
an improved paradigm that can update its blacklist automat-
ically. Platforms can derive new detection rules from new
detected users. The improved fraud detection paradigm is
shown in Fig 1(b).
The most critical part of the improved paradigm is au-
tomatically updating fraud users blacklist. It requires the
paradigm can detect new fraud users from unknown users,
especially potential fraud users who can not be detected by
existing detecting rules. Compared with traditional fraud
detection paradigm, our improved paradigm can find new
patterns of fraud users before they appear in large numbers
and cause huge losses to others. The potential fraud users de-
tection is offline, and the cost for the automatically updating
part will not have much influence in practice.
Based on the improved fraud detection paradigm, we de-
sign a creative fraud users detection model, FraudJudger.
It can detect fraud users and actively identify fraud users
beyond existing detecting rules from unknown users.
4 FRAUDJUDGER: FRAUD DETECTION MODEL
Model Overview
In this section, we introduce our fraud detection model,
FraudJudger. As shown in the new detection paradigm, our
model should contain two main functions: building fraud
users blacklist and automatically updating the blacklist. The
overview of our detection model is shown in Fig 2. The whole
detection model contains three phases:
Phase I:Merging features from raw data. Platforms col-
lect two main classes of information: operation data and
transaction data. We first merge the two classes data, and
the merged features are passed to our fraud detection part.
Phase II: Building fraud users blacklist. Merged features
in Phase I are of high dimensions, which can not be used
directly. We can omit ineffective and noisy features and get
efficient low dimension features with the help of adversarial
autoencoder. In the meantime, we can detect fraud users by
a few labeled data. It is a semi-supervised learning process.
Detected fraud users will be added in the blacklist.
Phase III: Updating fraud users blacklist by cluster anal-
ysis. The key idea is to find new fraud users beyond existing
detection rules. In this phase, we train a new AAE network
without labels to learn the latent representations of users.
Then we cluster these latent variables from the network.
After clustering latent variables, different users groups are
formed. We detect fraud users with new patterns from these
fraud groups.
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Figure 2: The overview of FraudJudger
Merging Features
Many electronic payment platforms record users’ operation
and transaction information. Operation data contain users’
operation actions on payment platforms, such as device in-
formation, operation type (changing password, viewing bal-
ance, etc), operation time, etc. Transaction data contain user’s
transaction information, such as transaction time, transac-
tion amount, transaction receiver, etc.
A user may leave many operation and transaction records
on the electronic payment platform. We proposed an appro-
priate method to merge a user’s records on the platform.
We merge the two kinds of features by the key feature,
which is "user id". It means that features belong to the same
user will be merged. The value of each feature can be divided
into two types, numeric and non-numeric. Numeric features
can be analyzed directly. For non-numeric features, such
as location information or device types, we use one-hot en-
coding method to convert them into a numeric vector. Each
non-numeric feature is mapped into a discrete vector after
one-hot encoding. If two features fi and fj have connections,
we will construct a new feature fnew to combine the two
features. The new feature fnew contains statistic properties
of fi and fj .
Building fraud users blacklist
In this phase, our model detects fraud users and build a fraud
users blacklist. The main purposes of our models in this
phase are:
(1) Learning latent vectors of users.
(2) Detecting fraud users by latent vectors with a small
scale of labels.
The dimension of merged features from Phase I is too high
to analyze directly for the following reasons:
(1) Raw data contain irrelevant information, which is noise
in our perspective. These irrelevant features will waste
computation resources and affect the model’s perfor-
mance.
(2) High dimension features will weaken the model’s gen-
eralization ability. Detection model will be easily over-
fitted.
We should reduce the dimension of features and only
leave essential features. Furthermore, if we manually choose
important features based on experience, it will be hard to
find new fraud patterns when fraud users change their attack
patterns.
We build a semi-supervised AAE (semi-AAE) based fraud
detection model to learn the latent representations of merged
features and classify users. Our detection network contains
three parts: encoder E, decoder E ′ and two discriminators
D1 and D2. Fig 3 shows the architecture of our detection
network.
Figure 3: Architecture of semi-AAE network for fraud detec-
tion in FraudJudger
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Encoder: For an input merged feature x , encoder E will
learn the latent representation z of x . The dimension of the
latent variables z is less than the dimension of the input
x , and the encoder’s network structure determines it. The
encoding procedure can be regarded as dimensionality re-
duction. Besides, it will output an extra one-hot variable y
to indicate the class of input value, which is a benign user
or fraud user in our model. Our model uses y to classify
an unknown user. The inner structure of the encoder is a
multi-layer network in our model.
E(x) = (y, z) (5)
Decoder: The purpose of the decoder is learning how to
reconstruct the input of the encoder from encoder’s outputs.
The decoder’s procedure is the inverse of the encoder. Inputs
of the decoder E ′ are outputs of the encoder E. The decoder
will learn how to reconstruct inputs x from y and z. The
output of the decoder is x ′. The inner structure of the decoder
is also the inverse of the inner structure of the encoder.
E ′(y, z) = x ′ (6)
Loss of Encoder-Decoder: The loss of the encoder and
the decoder Le−d is defined by mean-square loss between
the input x of the encoder and output x ′ of the decoder. It
measures the similarity between x and x ′.
Le−d = E((x − x ′)2) (7)
Generator: Encoding the classy and latent vectors z from
x can be regarded as the generator. Let p(y) be the prior
distribution of y, which is the distributions of fraud users
and benign users in the real world. And p(z) is the prior
distribution of z, which is assumed as Gaussian distribution:
z ∼ N(µ, σ 2). The generator tries to generate y and z in
their prior distributions to fool the discriminators. The loss
function of the generator LG is:
LG = −E(loд(1 − D1(z)) + loд(1 − D2(y))) (8)
Discriminator: Like the discriminator of GAN, we use
discriminators in our model to judge whether a variable is
real or fake. Since the encoder has two outputs, y and z,
we have two discriminators to discriminate them separately.
The discriminators will judge whether a variable is in the
real distribution. The loss function of discriminators LD are
defined as:
LD1 = −E(azloд(D1(z)) + (1 − az )loд(1 − D1(z)))
LD2 = −E(ayloд(D2(y)) + (1 − ay )loд(1 − D2(y)))
LD = LD1 + LD2
(9)
where az , ay are the true labels (fake samples or real) of
inputs z and y. The total loss of the discriminator part is the
sum of each discriminator.
Classifier:We can teach the encoder to output the right
label y with the help of a few samples with labels. And the
loss function LC is:
LC = −E(a′yloд(y) + (1 − a′y )loд(1 − y)) (10)
where a′y means the right label (fraud samples or benign)
for a sample, and y is the output label from the encoder.
When the encoder outputs a wrong label, the classifier will
back-propagate the classification loss and teach the encoder
how to predict right labels correctly.
Training Procedure: The generator generates like the
real label information y and latent representations z by the
encoder network. Two discriminators try to judge whether
the inputs are fake or real. It is a two-player min-max game.
The generator tries to generate true values to fool discrim-
inators, and discriminators are improving discrimination
accuracy. Both of the generator and discriminators will im-
prove their abilities simultaneously. For samples with labels,
they can help to increase the classification ability of our
model.
Once the training of the semi-AAE model finishes, we can
use it to classify users and build a fraud users blacklist.
Updating fraud users blacklist
The fraud detection part of FraudJudger can help us identify
users based on rules we have known. We also hope that our
model can detect users beyond existing detecting rules that
we have known. In this section, we will teach our model how
to learn unknown rules. The intuition is that we can identify
potential fraud users with new fraud patterns. The architec-
ture of the fraud updating part is shown in Fig 4. It contains
two parts, learning latent representations of unknown users
by AAE network, and finding new fraud patterns from latent
representations.
Figure 4: Architecture of detecting new fraud patterns in
FraudJudger
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Learning latent representations from unknown users. First,
we build another adversarial autoencoder network to learn
latent representations of new users without labels. As we can
see from Fig 4, the network of learning latent representations
in this phase has slight changes comparing with the network
in Fig 3.
Since we need to find new fraud patterns from unknown
users, we do not have label information in training data. We
want to learn appropriate latent representation z of input x
so that we can analyze users by z. The first change of the net-
work is that the encoder only outputs latent representation
z instead of label information y. All information of a user is
contained in the latent representation. The discriminator for
label information is deleted as well. Since we have no data
with labels, we do not have loss function for classification as
well. The training phase of this network is also a two-player
min-max game.
Cluster analysis to find potential fraud users. After learning
users’ latent representations, we can find potential fraud
users from unknown users by cluster analysis. Algorithm 1
shows the procedure of finding potential fraud users.
First, we classify unknown users by the classifier we con-
struct in Section 4. Detected fraud users in this step are
identified based on existing detection rules. Our aim is find-
ing potential fraud users who have unknown fraud patterns.
Potential fraud users will be wrongly classified as benign
users in this step. We cluster users by their latent represen-
tations. Fraud users’ behavior patterns are different from
benign users’. Cluster analysis can cluster users with similar
behavior patterns in the same group. We choose k-means
as our cluster analysis method. Users will form k clusters
by k-means. Ideally, users can be divided into two groups
by clustering, one is fraud users group, and the other one
is benign users group. However, it does not work in reality.
Both of benign users and fraud users contain various kinds
of behavior patterns on the electronic payment platforms. It
is not reasonable to only cluster users into two groups. An
appropriate cluster number ncluster should be chosen. And
users will be partitioned into ncluster groups. Each group
contains users in a similar behavior pattern. Each group will
be a benign user group or fraud user group depending on
the ratio of detected fraud users. If the ratio is larger than a
threshold tf raud , we regard this group as fraud users group.
If we find a user who is judged as a benign user in a fraud
user group, he has high similarities with fraud users in his
group, which indicates that he is more likely to be a fraud
user in practice.
The intuition of our potential fraud users detection algo-
rithm is that fraud users will gather together by clustering,
and the learned latent representations ensure it. In traditional
detection methods, features are manually chosen based on
Algorithm 1: Finding Potential Fraud Users
Input: Set of unknown users U = {u1,u2, ...,un} ;
ClassifierCl f // The classification model we constructed
;
Cluster numbers ncluster , the threshold of fraud users
ratio tf raud ;
Output: Potential fraud users set Up
1 Set of users’ predicted labels Y = {y1,y2, ...,yn} ;
2 Set of clustering group G = {д1,д2, ...,дncluster } ;
3 for i = 1, ...,n do
4 yi = Cl f (ui ) // Classify each user by FraudJudger;
5 end
6 G = Cluster (U,ncluster ) // Cluster users to ncluster
groups;
7 for i = 1, ...,ncluster do
8 Calculate the ratio of fraud users rf aud ;
9 if rf aud > tf raud then
10 for user uj in group i do
11 if yj = benign users then
12 Add uj to Up
13 end
14 end
15 end
16 end
historical knowledge. We cannot find new fraud patterns
in this way. In our FraudJudger model, we can learn latent
representations of users without prior fraud detection knowl-
edge. Even if fraud users change part of their fraud patterns,
our model can still detect them.
If potential fraud users are found, we can update our back-
list and new detection rules can be derived by platforms.
5 EXPERIMENT
In this section, we first describe the real-world dataset we
use in Section 5. Then we evaluate FraudJudger’s detection
performance in Section 5. In order to intuitively showing the
latent representations, we visualize the latent vectors of users
in Section 5. Next, we evaluate the performance of cluster
analysis in Section 5. Finally, we find the best dimension of
latent representations in Section 5.
Dataset Description
We use a real-world dataset from Bestpay, which is a popular
digital payment platform. The dataset has been anonymized
before we use in case of privacy leakage. The dataset contains
more than 29,000 user’s operation behaviors and transaction
behaviors in 30 days. All users in the dataset are manually la-
beled. We regard labels in this dataset as ground truth. In this
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dataset, the amount of fraud users is 4,046, which accounts
for 13.78% of total users. The dataset contains two kinds of
data, one is operation data, and the other one is transaction
data. There are 20 features in operation data and 27 features
in transaction data. Some important operation features are
listed in Table 1, and part of important transaction features
are listed in Table 2.
Table 1: Part features in operation data
Feature Explanation Missing rate
mode user’s operation type 0%
time operation time 0%
device operation device 29.3%
version operation version 19%
IP device’s IP address 18.0%
MAC device’s MAC address 89.9%
os device’s operation system 0%
geo_code location information 33.9%
Table 2: Part features in transaction data
Feature Explanation Missing rate
time transaction time 0%
device transaction device 34.2%
tran_amt transaction amount 0%
IP device’s IP address 14.6%
channel platform type 0%
acc_id account id 62.1%
balance balance after transaction 0%
trains_type type of transaction 0%
As shown in Table 1 and Table 2, there are some common
features in both operation data and transaction data.We have
some essential and useful information, like IP address, time,
amounts, etc, to analyze a user’s behavior. After merging
features, we get 2174 dimensions of features for each user.
Some features have a high missing rate, like acc_id . We filter
out features with a missing rate more than 30%, and get
940-dimensional merged features for each user. FraudJudger
will analyze the 940-dimensional merged features to detect
frauds.
Detection Performance
In this experiment, we evaluate the detection ability of Fraud-
Judger. First, we compare the model’s performance with dif-
ferent proportions of labeled data. Then, we compare Fraud-
Judger with other well-known supervised detection methods.
Different proportions of labeled data. We use 20,000 samples
for training and the rest 9,354 samples for evaluating. To
evaluate the performance of our model, we set five groups of
experiments with different proportions of labeled samples:
• 1% samples with labels.
• 2.5% samples with labels.
• 5% samples with labels.
• 10% samples with labels.
• 25% samples with labels.
The dimension of latent representations in our experiment
is 100. We use a five-layer neural network as the structure
of our encoder and decoder. The number of neurons in each
hidden layer is 1024. Models are trained in 500 epochs, and
the batch size in training is 200.
We use four acknowledged standard performance mea-
sures to evaluate our model, which is precision, accuracy,
recall and F-1 score. Precision is the fraction of true detected
fraud users among all users classified as fraud users. Accu-
racy is the proportion of users who are correctly classified.
Recall is intuitively the ability of the model to find all the
fraud samples. F1-score is a weighted harmonic mean of
precision and recall.
1
F1 − score =
1
Precsion
+
1
Recall
(11)
And the result is shown in Fig 5.
Figure 5: Accuracy, Precision, Recall and F1 Score of models
Fig 5 illustrates our model FraudJudger can achieve better
performance with more labeled training samples. When the
ratio of labeled samples is less than 10%, the performance
of the model increases rapidly as the ratio of labeled sample
increases. When the ratio of labeled samples is more than
10%, the increasing speed slows down. As we mentioned
before, it is hard to obtain enough labeled samples to train our
model in practical application. We do not need to use a large
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number of manually labeled data. Our experiment result
shows that FraudJudger can achieve excellent classification
performance with a small ratio of labeled data.
Compared with supervised models. We compare our model’s
classification performance with other supervised classifi-
cation models. Three different excellent machine learning
models are chosen: Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA), Ran-
dom Forest and Adaptive Boosting model (AdaBoost). We
set three groups of FraudJudger models with 5% labels, 10%
labels, and 20% labels, respectively. We use the ROC curve
to evaluate the result. The result is shown in Figure 6, and
the AUC of each model is shown in Table 3.
Figure 6: ROC of FraudJudger and other models
Table 3: AUC of FraudJudger and other models
Models AUC
FraudJudger-5%labels 0.944
FraudJudger-10%labels 0.983
FraudJudger-20%labels 0.985
LDA 0.946
Random Forest 0.930
AdaBoost 0.975
As we can see from the result, the model’s detection ac-
curacy increases with more labeled training data. When the
proportion of labeled data is larger than 10%, FraudJudger
outperforms all other supervised classification models. If we
use fewer labels, FraudJudger still has satisfying performance.
Compared with other supervised algorithms, we save more
than 90% work on manually labeling data and we achieve
better performance.
In conclusion, FraudJudger has an excellent performance
on fraud users detection even with a small ratio of labeled
data. Comparing with other supervised fraud detection meth-
ods, FraudJudger has a low requirement for the amount of
labeled data. Our model can be applied in more realistic
situations.
Visualization of Latent Representation
FraudJudger uses learned latent representations to detect
fraud users. In order to have an intuitively understanding
of the latent representations, we use t-SNE [16] to visual-
ize the latent representations learned from FraudJudger. T-
SNE is a practical method to visualize high-dimensional data
by giving each data point a location in a two-dimensional
map. Here we choose the dimension of latent representa-
tions equals to 100, and the ratio of labeled data is 10%. The
visualized result of t-SNE is shown in Fig 7.
Figure 7: Visualization of latent representations by t-SNE
As we can see from Fig 7, the red points represent fraud
users, and blue points represent benign users. Fraud users
and benign users are well separated by latent representations.
Benign users gather together and benign users are isolated to
benign users. It means that the latent representations learned
from FraudJudger can well separate benign users and fraud
users.
Furthermore, we cluster latent representations into five
groups by K-means, and we visualize the result in Fig 8.
Fig 8 contains five different colors, and five colors repre-
senting five different groups of users. It is hoped that benign
users and fraud users will form different groups after clus-
tering, and the cluster result verifies it. The dividing lines
, , Ruoyu Deng and Na Ruan
Figure 8: Visualization of cluster result of latent representa-
tions
between different groups are quite apparent. Comparing
Fig 8 with Fig 7, we can find that most fraud users are clus-
tered into the same group in Fig 8. The fraud users in Fig 7
are corresponding to the purple group in Fig 8. Benign users
with different behavior patterns are clustered into four differ-
ent groups. Fraud users and benign users are well separated
by cluster analysis.
Cluster Result
In this section, we measure the performance of cluster analy-
sis. As we mentioned in Section 4, we use cluster analysis to
find potential fraud users. A more reasonable cluster result
indicates that more likely to find potential fraud users.
After clustering, users are clustered into ncluster groups,
and each group contains fraud users and benign users. If a
group’s fraud users ratio is larger than the threshold tf raud ,
we regard this group as fraud group. However, different
users may gather together because of other criterions, such
as age, gender, etc. Different ages or genders of users will
gather together instead of fraud users or benign users. We
should measure whether users gather together with the right
criterion.
We propose a new measurement R called "Cluster Recall"
to measure the performance of the cluster result in gathering
fraud users into the same group. R equals to the ratio of the
number of fraud users in fraud groups and the number of
all fraud users. A larger cluster recall indicates that more
fraud users will gather into the same group, and the latent
variables are better in representing fraud behaviors. A more
reasonable learned latent representations will lead to a better
cluster recall.
R = the number o f f raud users in f raud дroups
the number o f total f raud users
(12)
We set the threshold tf raud equals to 0.7. And we have
four different models:
(1) Origin features: merged features without dimensional-
ity reduction
(2) DAE: latent representations learned by DAE [22] (De-
noising Autoencoder)
(3) VAE: latent representations learned by VAE [12] (Vari-
ational Autoencoder)
(4) FraudJudger: our proposed model in learning latent
representations
In the first group, we cluster origin features directly. Both
of DAE and VAE are well-known unsupervised methods
to learn representations of a set of data. We use them as
comparison models. We use k-means as our cluster methods.
We set ncluster = 2, 5, 100, and the result is shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Cluster Recall for different models
Number of cluster 10 50 100
Origin Features 0.05 0.18 0.36
DAE 0.14 0.43 0.55
VAE 0.09 0.32 0.42
FraudJudger 0.30 0.48 0.59
Table 4 shows that our proposed model FraudJudger has
a better performance than VAE and DAE in all three groups
of different cluster numbers. It indicates that our model can
better learn behavior patterns of fraud users. When the clus-
ter number increases, the cluster recall is larger. However,
it is meaningless if we use a too large number of clusters. If
ncluster is too large, the number of users in each group after
clustering will be small. It will be hard for digital payment
platforms to analyze users’ behavior patterns in this group.
All of the dimensionality reduction models have a signifi-
cant improvement compared with the group that uses origin
features without dimensionality reduction. The experiment
demonstrates that fraud users with similar fraud patterns
will gather together in our model. We can use our model to
find potential fraud users. If we set a lower tf raud , we can
findmore suspicious potential fraud users, and the credibility
of suspicious potential users will drop. We should balance
this in the real-world application.
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Dimension of Latent Representations
We analyze the performance of different dimensions of latent
representations in FraudJudger to find the appropriate dimen-
sions in practice. We use cluster recall R and adjust mutual
information (AMI) [23] to measure models’ performance in
different dimensions.
AMI is a variation of mutual information (MI) to compare
two clusterings results. A higher AMI indicates the distribu-
tions of the two groups are more similar. For two groups A
and B, the AMI is given as below:
AMI (A,B) = MI (A,B) − E(MI (A,B))
avд(H (A),H (B)) − E(MI (A,B)) (13)
In our experiment, we calculate the AMI between data
distribution of real data and data distribution of cluster re-
sults. We use 10% labeled data when training FraudJudger.
Ten groups of different dimensions of latent representations
from 0 to 512 are conducted, and the result is shown in Fig 9:
Figure 9: Performance of different dimensions of latent rep-
resentations
The result shows that the performance of FraudJudger
varies with dimensions of latent representations. When the
dimension is too low (dimension = 1 or 2), cluster recall is 0.
Nearly no fraud users gather together in the same group. It
shows that FraudJudger has poor performance in this case.
Low dimensions of latent vectors cannot learn data distri-
bution well. The model will lose many important features
due to too low dimensions. When the dimension is higher,
latent vectors contain more information about origin data,
and the model’s performance is better. When the dimen-
sion is around 128, FraudJudger has the best performance
both in cluster recall and AMI. When the dimension of la-
tent representations is too high, the performance decreases
again. Under this circumstance, the model will learn a lot of
noise features, which is harmful. Besides, a large dimension
will lead to high model complexity and over-fitted. Thus,
we should choose the dimension of latent representations
around 128.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel fraud users detection
model FraudJudger on real-world digital payment platforms.
FraudJudger can learn latent features of users from origi-
nal features and classify users based on the learned latent
features. We overcome restrictions of real-world data, and
only a few labeled training data are required. Fraud pat-
terns are diverse and evolving, and our proposed method
can be used in finding potential fraud users from unknown
users, which is useful in anti-frauding. Our experiment is
based on a real-world dataset, and the result demonstrates
that FraudJudger has a good performance in fraud detection.
Compared with other well-known methods, FraudJudger has
advantages in learning latent representations of fraud users
and saves more than 90% manually labeling work. We have
seen broad prospects of deep learning in fraud detection.
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